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THE EVOLUTION OF COMMERCIAL LAW 
NORMS: LESSONS TO BE LEARNED FROM 
ELECTRONIC COMMERCE 
Amelia H. Boss* 
INTRODUCTION 
ommercial law in the United States is the product of centuries of 
development. For many years, apart from the common law influ-
ences of our mother country,1 the development of commercial norms and 
commercial laws in the United States occurred with relatively little re-
gard for international norms and international commercial law develop-
ments.2 Indeed, for many scholars in the United States looking at the de-
velopment of commercial law norms, the study of commercial law had 
been primarily inwardly focused, for example, on the role of entities such 
as the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws 
and the American Law Institute in the process,3 or the appropriate alloca-
tion of responsibility between the states and the federal government.4 
The landscape has changed somewhat over the past two decades, how-
ever, as we have observed the emergence of an “International Uniform 
                                                                                                                       
 *  Trustee Professor of Law, Drexel University, Earle Macke School of Law. 
 1. One might also note the origins of the Uniform Commercial Code in the British 
codification movement of the nineteenth century. See generally GERALD POSTEMA, BENT-
HAM AND THE COMMON LAW TRADITION (Tony Honoré & Joseph Raz eds., 1986). See 
also CHARLES M. COOK, THE AMERICAN CODIFICATION MOVEMENT: A STUDY OF 
ANTEBELLUM LEGAL REFORM 76–77 (1981); Charles Noble Gregory, Bentham and the 
Codifiers, 13 HARV. L. REV. 344, 356 (1900). Indeed, Bentham once wrote to President 
Madison volunteering to create a code for the New World. Jeremy Bentham, Legislator 
of the World: Writings on Codification, Law and Education, in THE COLLECTED WORKS 
OF JEREMY BENTHAM 20–21 (Philip Schofield & Jonathan Harris eds., 1998). 
 2. This is ironic, given the historical roots of commercial law in the law merchant or 
law of the itinerant merchant, which was law that had no geographic limitations. 
 3. See, e.g., Peter A. Alces & David Frisch, On the UCC Revision Process: A Reply 
to Dean Scott, 37 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1217 (1996); Larry E. Ribstein & Bruce H. Ko-
bayashi, An Economic Analysis of Uniform State Laws, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 131 (1996); 
Steven L. Schwarcz, A Fundamental Inquiry into the Statutory Rulemaking Process of 
Private Legislatures, 29 GA. L. REV. 909, 921 (1995); Alan Schwartz, The Still Question-
able Role of Private Legislatures, 62 LA. L. REV. 1147 (2002); Alan Schwartz & Robert 
E. Scott, The Political Economy of Private Legislatures, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 595 (1995). 
But see Paul B. Stephan, The Futility of Unification and Harmonization in International 
Commercial Law, 39 VA. J. INT’L L. 743 (1999). 
 4. See, e.g., A. Brooke Overby, Modeling UCC Drafting, 29 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 645 
(1996); A. Brooke Overby, Our New Commercial Law Federalism, 76 TEMP. L. REV. 297 
(2003); Kathleen Patchel, Interest Group Politics, Federalism, and the Uniform Laws 
Process: Some Lessons from the Uniform Commercial Code, 78 MINN. L. REV. 83 (1993). 
C
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Commercial Code.” The 1980 Convention on the International Sale of 
Goods,5 which came into force a little over twenty years ago, is, of 
course, one of the core components of this emerging code; joining it are 
newer conventions such as the Cape Town Convention on International 
Interests in Mobile Equipment,6 promulgated by the Institute for the Un-
ification of Private International Law (“UNIDROIT”),7 and the Hague 
Convention on the Law Applicable to Certain Rights in Respect of Se-
curities Held with an Intermediary, promulgated by the Hague Confe-
rence on Private International Law in 2002.8 Supplementing these “hard 
laws” are, of course, soft law products9 such as the UNIDROIT Prin-
                                                                                                                       
 5. United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, Apr. 
11, 1980, 1489 U.N.T.S. 3. 
 6. UNIDROIT Convention on International Interests in Mobile Equipment, Nov. 16, 
2001, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 108-10, available at http://www.unidroit.org/english/conven 
tions/mobile-equipment/mobile-equipment.pdf. 
 7. UNIDROIT is an independent intergovernmental organization founded in 1926 
and presently composed of sixty-three Member States. The Institute’s seat is located in 
Rome. UNIDROIT: An Overview, http://www.unidroit.org/dynasite.cfm?dsmid=84219 
(last visited Apr. 3, 2009). 
 8. The Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to Certain Rights in Respect of 
Securities Held with an Intermediary, July 5, 2006, available at http://hcch.e-vision.nl/ 
index_en.php?act=conventions.text&cid=72. See also generally James Steven Rogers, 
Conflict of Laws for Transactions in Securities Held Through Intermediaries, 39 COR-
NELL INT’L L.J. 285 (2006). There are other completed international commercial law in-
struments as well as others on the drafting tables of organizations such as UNCITRAL, 
UNIDROIT, and the Hague Conference; these are just illustrations of the phenomenon. 
 9. The following is a cogent description of the dichotomy between “hard law” and 
“soft law”: 
Soft law means rules that do not emerge from an autonomous source of law and 
are not law in that sense. In the international commercial and financial sphere, 
soft law often means proposals or sets of principles from UNIDROIT, 
UNCITRAL or other such organizations, or from think-tanks that aspire to re-
flect the living law particularly at the transnational level. Academic opinion 
may also be part of soft law. If soft law reaches the level of treaty law, it will 
operate in that category and becomes, then, law. Soft law may also attain the 
level of law as custom or general principle. . . . To repeat, short of soft law 
emerging as custom or general principle, it is not law, and therefore not a norm 
that must be applied, although it may provide guidance (usually supplementary 
to hard law or as some manifestation thereof). The UNIDROIT and European 
Contract Principles are of this nature, as are many unratified UNIDROIT and 
UNCITRAL projects, and their model laws. 
J.H. Dalhuisen, Custom and Its Revival in Transnational Private Law, 18 DUKE J. COMP. 
& INT’L L. 339, 355–57 (2008). For a discussion of the various types of international 
lawmaking, including “soft law” and “hard law,” see ALAN BOYLE & CHRISTINE CHINKIN, 
THE MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 211–29 (2007). 
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ciples of International Commercial Contracts, which, like the Restate-
ment of Contracts in the United States, can be used to fill the gaps left by 
the “harder” treaty-based law.10 Model laws, drafted for States to use as 
guidance if they so desire, are another form of “soft law”11 used in the 
international commercial arena.12 
As these international conventions and products have evolved, howev-
er, interesting questions have been presented: how international norms 
take root; how they can be cultivated and the unique challenges they 
raise for policymakers; the interrelationship among the various methods 
of lawmaking (whether their final results are categorized as hard law or 
soft law); the relationship between international and national lawmaking 
bodies, and the relationship (in the United States) between federal and 
state lawmakers. 
The more recent area of electronic commerce offers a unique opportu-
nity to examine these issues. The opportunity is unique for several rea-
sons. Unlike many (or most) areas of commercial law, the evolution of 
commercial law norms governing electronic communications and trans-
actions is a relatively recent phenomenon. The speed with which elec-
tronic commerce has developed and spread throughout the world has 
placed a premium on the need to develop governing norms definitively 
and just as swiftly. As a result, what took generations to occur in areas 
such as sales or secured transactions has occurred in a matter of decades 
with electronic commerce. 
The case study of electronic commerce reveals several important les-
sons. Some of these lessons mirror the experiences from other areas of 
commercial law. First, it is imperative that any legal structure be built 
upon and reflect commercial practices in order for there to be an accept-
                                                                                                                       
 10. For a helpful book on the UNIDROIT Principles, see MICHAEL JOACHIM BONELL, 
AN INTERNATIONAL RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACT LAW: THE UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES OF 
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS (1994). 
 11. A. Claire Cutler, Virginia Haufler & Tony Porter, The Contours and Significance 
of Private Authority in International Affairs, in PRIVATE AUTHORITY AND INTERNATIONAL 
AFFAIRS 333, 367–68 (A. Claire Cutler et al., 1999) (“Soft law includes statements of 
principles, guidelines, understandings, model laws[,] and codes, and declarations that . . . 
are ‘neither strictly binding norms of law, nor completely irrelevant political maxims, and 
operate in a grey zone between law and politics.’”). 
 12. Examples of model laws in the field include the U.N. COMM’N ON INT’L TRADE 
LAW, MODEL LAW ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 1985, U.N. Sales No. 
E.08.V.4 (2008), and the U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law [UNCITRAL], UNCITRAL 
Model Law on International Credit Transfers, in Report of the United Nations Commis-
sion on International Trade Law on the Work of Its Twenty-Fifth Session, U.N. GAOR, 
47th Sess., Supp. No. 17, Annex 1, U.N. DOC. A/47/17 (May 22, 1992), reprinted in 32 
I.L.M. 587 (1993). 
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able and viable system for trade. Second, while commercial practices are 
developing or in flux, it is crucial that any legal norms be sufficiently 
minimal and flexible to accommodate growth and change. This flexibili-
ty and adaptability, deemed important to many actors in the development 
of legal norms, can easily be lost, however; and harmonization can be 
defeated when these norms are adapted as part of “hard law” through the 
process of implementation. And thus a third, related lesson: where too 
high a premium is placed on speed in developing rules, the end product 
runs the risk of stultifying or jeopardizing future developments. 
There are other lessons, however, that can be learned from electronic 
commerce, lessons that are not as apparent in other areas. Elsewhere in 
this Symposium Issue, Professor McDonald has critically examined three 
metaphors often used to describe international law reform activities, 
“harmonization,” “transplantation,” and “viral propagation.”13 Electronic 
commerce law reform activity is a good illustration of a different form of 
international lawmaking, the process of symbiosis. It is symbiotic in sev-
eral respects: there is symbiosis between the domestic and the interna-
tional development of norms; between and among countries; and be-
tween the legal world and the business world. A second and related key 
point: while elsewhere there may be discussions of the appropriate roles 
of “soft” and “hard” lawmaking, and the relative merits of these types of 
lawmaking, study in the area of electronic commerce demonstrates that 
what is important is not necessarily the form that the lawmaking product 
takes (treaty, statute, model law, model agreement), but the process that 
leads to its formulation. In other words, the process is in many ways as 
important if not more so than the product itself. Most important are the 
development and exchange of ideas, and the education that occurs during 
the drafting process.14 A corollary is that one cannot really judge the suc-
cess of either a soft law or a hard law project solely by its (intended) im-
plementation or adoption by a state or nation state; rather, the impact 
must be assessed by the effect that the product and the process have on 
the development of the law more generally. 
There are a few other final and more sobering lessons. One is that 
when there is the occasional “misstep” in the development of legal 
norms, where a product of questionable long-term value is developed, the 
                                                                                                                       
 13. Roderick A. Macdonald, Three Metaphors of Norm Migration in International 
Context, 34 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 603, 603 (2009).  
 14. The author would have to admit to a certain bias in favor of education, given her 
career in the field. It should be noted that there is a project within the United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development (“UNCTAD”), the TrainForTrade programme, 
which focuses on training and capacity building in the field of electronic commerce. See 
generally TrainForTrade, http://learn.unctad.org/ (last visited Apr. 11, 2009). 
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same factors that contributed to the symbiotic development of law in the 
first place may similarly contribute to the propagation of this “misstep” 
in other jurisdictions. The end result may not be harmonization, but 
fragmentation. Correcting or containing that misstep becomes problemat-
ic. A related observation: as legal norms advance in their maturation, the 
process of symbiosis slows down as other differences emerge. It is too 
early to tell whether this lull in the symbiotic process signals its end. 
Now on to the story. 
I. THE BIRTH OF ELECTRONIC COMMERCE LEGAL NORMS 
In the area of electronic commerce, in a short period of twelve years, 
we have seen (at a minimum) three instruments emerge from one interna-
tional body, the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law 
(“UNCITRAL”),15 in a process that has been called “vertical integra-
tion.”16 Other electronic commerce products have emerged from other 
U.N. bodies such as the United Nations Centre for Trade Facilitation and 
Electronic Business (“UN/CEFACT”),17 from regional harmonization 
programs in electronic commerce (such as that within the Association of 
                                                                                                                       
 15. These three instruments are the UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON ELECTRONIC 
COMMERCE, U.N. Doc. A/Res/51/162/Annex, U.N. Sales No. E.99.V.4 (1999); the 
UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON ELECTRONIC SIGNATURES WITH GUIDE TO ENACTMENT 2001, 
U.N. Sales No. E.02.V.8 (2002); and the 2005 United Nations Convention on the Use of 
Electronic Communications in International Contracts, G.A. Res. 60/21, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/60/21 (Dec. 9, 2005). The Convention was published with an accompanying ex-
planatory note. U.N. CONVENTION ON THE USE OF ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS IN 
INTERNATIONAL CONTRACTS, at 13–100, U.N. Sales No. E.07.V.2 (2007) [hereinafter 
SECRETARIAT’S EXPLANATORY NOTE]. 
 16. Susan Block-Lieb & Terence C. Halliday, Incrementalisms in Global Lawmaking, 
32 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 851, 854, 868–72 (2007) (speaking of the progression from the two 
model laws to the United Nations Convention on the Use of Electronic Communications 
in International Contracts as “vertical incrementalism,” where “international organiza-
tions dig more deeply in a particular area over progressive rounds”). 
 17. Formerly known as the United Nations Working Party on the Facilitation of In-
ternational Trade Procedures (Working Party or W.P.4), it operates in Geneva under the 
auspices of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe and is the international 
body responsible for developing international standards for electronic data interchange. 
See United Nations Centre for Trade Facilitation and Electronic Business, About Us, 
http://www.unece.org/cefact/about.htm (last visited Apr. 3, 2009). Another U.N. entity 
that has taken a role in the evolution of electronic commerce norms is the UNCTAD, 
which among other efforts publishes an Information Economy Report that “focus[es] on 
trends in information and communications technologies . . . , such as e-commerce and e-
business, and on national and international policy and strategy options for improving the 
development impact of these technologies in developing countries.” UNCTAD, Main 
Publications, http://www.unctad.org/Templates/Page.asp?intItemID=1717&lang=1 (last 
visited Apr. 1, 2009). 
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Southeast Asian Nations),18 from industry groups,19 and from efforts to 
accommodate electronic commerce within other substantive projects (in 
the area of secured transactions or maritime law, for example) by bor-
rowing principles and rules from electronic commerce instruments.20 Ul-
timately, within the area of electronic commerce, we have examples of a 
variety of soft law and hard law approaches to electronic commerce. Yet 
the three products produced by UNCITRAL, two model laws (which 
might be characterized as soft law) and a convention (hard law), provide 
a unique opportunity to examine the evolution of commercial law norms, 
an evolution in which UNCITRAL has played a key role. Two of these 
UNCITRAL products (one model law, one convention) contain striking-
ly similar if not identical provisions. A study of the evolution of these 
instruments and their success in achieving adherence or implementation 
gives us an opportunity to compare and examine the interrelationship 
between soft law and hard law products. Though the sample is small, this 
study enables us to examine questions such as whether the existence of 
soft law is a help or a hindrance to the development of hard law; whether 
soft law or hard law is more effective in achieving adoption; whether soft 
                                                                                                                       
 18. For a description of the products of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations in 
the area of electronic commerce, see Chris Connolly, Using the Electronic Communica-
tions Convention to Harmonize National and International Electronic Commerce Laws: 
An ASEAN Case Study, in THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE USE OF ELECTRONIC 
COMMUNICATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL CONTRACTS: AN IN-DEPTH GUIDE AND 
SOURCEBOOK 315, 317 (Amelia H. Boss & W. Kilian eds., 2008) [hereinafter U.N. GUIDE 
TO ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS]. 
 19. The International Chamber of Commerce (“ICC”), for example, has produced its 
Electronic Uniform Customs and Practices (“eUCP”), a supplement to its Uniform Cus-
toms and Practices 500 (“UCP 500”) that covers situations where electronic presentation 
of documents occurs, and General Usage for International Digitally Ensured Commerce 
(“GUIDEC”) and GUIDEC II, which provide a legal framework for the use of digital 
signatures and certification authorities. See LORNA BRAZELL, ELECTRONIC SIGNATURES 
LAW AND REGULATION 84 (2004) (describing the goals and content of GUIDEC); Coas-
tline Solutions, eUCP: Online Training in eUCP, http://www.coastlinesolutions.com/ 
eUCP.htm (last visited Apr. 5, 2009) (describing the UCP 500 versus the eUCP). In addi-
tion, it has published eTerms 2004 for parties trading electronically, and an accompany-
ing ICC Guide to Electronic Contracting explaining the use of those terms. See ICC’s 
Commission on Commercial Law and Practice, http://www.iccwbo.org/policy/law/id279/ 
index.html (last visited Apr. 5, 2009). See also Christopher Kuner, ICC Perspectives on the 
United Nations Electronic Communications Convention, in U.N. GUIDE TO ELECTRONIC 
COMMUNICATIONS, supra note 18, at 415, 415–21. 
 20. Two scholars examining the working agendas of all the UNCITRAL working 
groups during the year 2007 observed that five of the six working groups “are revisiting 
or revising existing international instruments to account for practical experience and 
technical developments since adoption.” Block-Lieb & Halliday, supra note 16, at 873 
n.53. 
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law or hard law is more effective in achieving harmonization (for, as 
Professor Macdonald observed, nations can adopt the same or similar 
products, but without tempering, the results would not necessarily be 
harmonious);21 whether hard law is feasible without the earlier develop-
ment of soft law; and the impact of drafting hard law without the prior 
existence of soft law. 
II. SETTING THE STAGE: THE EVOLUTION OF ELECTRONIC COMMERCIAL 
PRACTICES 
The story of the evolution of electronic commerce norms begins well 
before UNCITRAL produced its first model law in 1996. Twenty-five 
years ago, the Internet as we know it today was a thing of science fiction, 
and the phrase “electronic commerce” was unheard of, yet the glimmers 
of electronic commerce were beginning to emerge. Banks and other 
businesses and institutions started to use computer technology to com-
municate and explored ways to harness the technology for a competitive 
advantage, though the use of these technologies was limited. Nonethe-
less, the thought that some type of legal framework might be needed be-
gan to take hold.22 As early as 1984, the issue of the need for a legal 
structure to govern electronic commerce was articulated on an interna-
tional level by UNCITRAL, although at that time the phrase used to de-
scribe the phenomenon was “automatic data processing.”23 Despite 
UNCITRAL subsequently calling upon all nations to review their legal 
rules affecting the use of electronic technologies in commerce,24 there 
                                                                                                                       
 21. Macdonald, supra note 13, at 623–24. 
 22. The banking industry, at the forefront of developing legal norms for electronic 
commerce, led the way with the formulation of products both domestically (e.g., UCC 
Article 4A) and internationally. See UNCITRAL Model Law on International Credit 
Transfers, supra note 12. 
 23. See UNCITRAL, Report of the United Nations Commission on International 
Trade Law on the Work of Its Seventeenth Session, U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 17, ¶¶ 135–
36, U.N. Doc. A/39/17 (1984). This followed receipt of a report by the Secretary-General 
on the legal aspects of automatic data processing. See Secretary-General, Legal Aspects 
of Automatic Data Processing: Report of the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/254 
(1984). That report identified several legal issues involving electronic communications 
technology: the legal value of computer records as evidence, the requirement of a writing 
and its application in an electronic environment, authentication of the source and veracity 
of electronic transmissions, general conditions applied in electronic transactions, liability 
for erroneous or unauthorized transmissions, and electronic transmissions of bills of lad-
ing, which have traditionally been represented by a piece of paper. Id. 
 24. See UNCITRAL, Report of the United Nations Commission on International 
Trade Law on the Work of Its Seventeenth Session, supra note 23, ¶ 136. This recom-
mendation was endorsed by the United Nations General Assembly. See G.A. Res. 40/71, 
¶ 5, U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 17, U.N. Doc. A/40/17 (Dec. 11, 1985). 
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was virtually no response from governments around the world, on any 
level. In hindsight, that was probably a fortunate result, as over the next 
decade electronic commercial practices continued to grow and evolve. 
Indeed, electronic commerce practices began to develop at a time when 
no states, and no nation states, had laws tailored for electronic com-
merce. 
During the late 1980s, the use of electronic technologies in commerce 
increased and continued to develop, morphing from “automatic data 
processing” (“ADP”) into “electronic data interchange” (“EDI”),25 and 
the legal challenges it presented began to attract greater attention. One of 
the first responders was the Nordic Legal Community, which suggested 
interchange agreements between private trading partners to govern their 
use of electronic technologies in the communication and contracting 
process. This initial idea resulted in the ICC adopting the Uniform Rules 
of Conduct for Interchange of Trade Data by Teletransmission (“UNCID 
Rules”) in 1987.26 The UNCID Rules were a small set of nonmandatory 
rules, which EDI users and suppliers of network services could incorpo-
rate into any agreement between parties using electronic communications 
technologies. Following the publication of the UNCID Rules, numerous 
model interchange agreements were developed—by user groups 
representing specific industries (such as Odette, representing the automo-
tive industry, and the International Maritime Committee, representing the 
maritime industry), by industry groups (such as the U.K. EDI Associa-
tion and the EDI Council of Canada), by attorney groups (such as the 
American Bar Association),27 and by multinational organizations (such 
as the European Commission through its Trade Electronic Data Inter-
                                                                                                                       
 25. “Electronic data interchange” has been defined as “the computer-to-computer 
interchange of strictly formatted messages that represent documents other than monetary 
instruments.” NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., FED. INFO. PROCESSING STANDARDS 
PUBL’N 161-2, ANNOUNCING THE STANDARD FOR ELECTRONIC DATA INTERCHANGE (EDI) 
(Apr. 29, 1996), available at http://www.itl.nist.gov/fipspubs/fip161-2.htm. The shift 
from ADP to EDI is significant. ADP, which refers to computer assisted storing, manipu-
lating or processing information with minimal or no human interaction, is most often 
used to describe internal uses of information technology within a business. Conversely, 
EDI encompasses using information technology to communicate with external parties 
such as suppliers and customers. 
 26. Int’l Chamber of Commerce [ICC], Special Joint Comm. UNIFORM RULES OF 
CONDUCT FOR INTERCHANGE OF TRADE DATA BY TELETRANSMISSION (UNCID), ICC 
Publ’n No. 452 (1988). 
 27. See, e.g., Elec. Messaging Servs. Task Force, The Commercial Use of Electronic 
Data Interchange—A Report and Model Trading Partner Agreement, 45 BUS. LAW. 
1645, 1647–48 (1990). 
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change Systems Programme).28 These model interchange agreements 
were suggested for use by private parties who agreed to communicate 
electronically in their conduct of commercial transactions (generally pur-
chase and sale transactions). 
Cumulatively, these private law products, themselves a form of “soft 
law,” were to have a profound impact. First, most of these model agree-
ments were the results of collaboration between attorneys and industry 
participants; indeed, the agreements themselves dealt with both legal and 
business issues. Thus, they represent efforts to adapt the law to the prac-
tice, and the practice to the law. Second, groups in many geographic sec-
tors, industries, and countries worked diligently in developing their own 
agreements, but not without studying agreements that had been produced 
in other sectors, industries, and countries. Thus, symbiosis was already at 
work, and norms were beginning to evolve both domestically and inter-
nationally. Third, the proliferation of different agreements on national, 
sectoral, and association levels put pressure on international organiza-
tions to come up with an international and harmonized approach to these 
issues. Indeed, the provisions of these different agreements offered a 
sound basis for future norm construction. 
III. ACT ONE: UNICTRAL ENTERS THE STAGE WITH THE MODEL LAW 
ON ELECTRONIC COMMERCE29 
UNICTRAL began consideration of potential work in electronic com-
merce in the early 1990s.30 Among other possible projects, it considered 
drafting a model interchange agreement for electronic commerce; this 
proposal was ultimately rejected for two reasons. First, UNCITRAL rec-
ognized that as an international organization its primary focus was on the 
legal facilitation of international trade, and it might not have been as 
suited to the drafting of these types of agreements as other organizations 
whose constituents included businesspeople and technical people as well 
as lawyers.31 Instead, UNCITRAL concluded that it was uniquely si-
                                                                                                                       
 28. See AMELIA H. BOSS & JEFFREY B. RITTER, ELECTRONIC DATA INTERCHANGE 
AGREEMENTS: A GUIDE AND SOURCEBOOK 4–5, 15–18, 24 (1993); Amelia H. Boss, Elec-
tronic Data Interchange Agreements: Private Contracting Toward a Global Environ-
ment, 13 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 31, 40–41 (1992).  
 29. For the text of the Model Law, see UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON ELECTRONIC 
COMMERCE, supra note 15. 
 30. See generally Amelia H. Boss, Electronic Commerce and the Symbiotic Relation-
ship Between International and Domestic Law Reform, 72 TUL. L. REV. 1931, 1951–52 
(1998). 
 31. Two groups were at the time involved in drafting such model interchange agree-
ments. The first was the Working Party on the Facilitation of International Trade Proce-
dures, now known as UN/CEFACT. See supra note 17. In 1995, UN/CEFACT published 
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tuated to undertake the formulation of positive legal rules (either in con-
vention form or model law form) to assist countries in addressing the 
needs of electronic commerce in a harmonized manner, thereby eliminat-
ing barriers to international trade.32 
Second, and more importantly, UNCITRAL rightly noted that the pro-
liferation of model interchange agreements and the use of private order-
ing by the parties to electronic commerce transactions were not sufficient 
to address all of the legal issues revolving around the use of electronic 
commerce.33 In this respect, it is clear that there are important limitations 
on the ability of such soft law products to resolve all the issues presented 
by these transactions. Even with the evolution of these interchange 
agreements, questions still remained as to the legality and enforceability 
of electronically formed transactions, questions that could only affirma-
tively be resolved by judicial decision or legislation.34 Moreover, the 
transition from proprietary communications networks to the environment 
of the World Wide Web changed the commercial paradigm from one of 
trade between established trading partners to an increasing number of 
transactions between parties who had not had prior dealings with each 
other.35 For these parties, legal norms in soft law products that in essence 
                                                                                                                       
its Recommendation No. 26. Working Party on the Facilitation of Int’l Trade Procedures, 
Recommendation No. 26: Commercial Use of Interchange Agreements for Electronic 
Data Interchange, U.N. Doc. ECE/TRADE/WP.4/R.1133/Rev.1 (1995). The second 
body working on the development of a model agreement was the European Commission. 
It published its model interchange agreement in 1994. Commission Recommendation of 
19 October 1994 Relating to the Legal Aspects of Electronic Data Interchange, 94/820/EC, 
1994 O.J. (L 338) 98–117. 
 32. See, e.g., UNCITRAL, Working Group on Int’l Payments, Report of the Working 
Group on International Payments on the Work of Its Twenty-Fourth Session, ¶ 1, U.N. 
Doc. A/CN.9/360 (Feb. 17, 1992). It should be noted that there were technical and busi-
ness people present at the subsequent deliberations at UNCITRAL on electronic com-
merce, but they participated more as technical experts than as the crafters of the ultimate 
UNCITRAL products. 
 33. UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON ELECTRONIC COMMERCE WITH GUIDE TO 
ENACTMENT 1996, ¶ 140, U.N. Sales No. E.99.V.4 (1999) [hereinafter ELECTRONIC 
COMMERCE GUIDE TO ENACTMENT]. 
 34. For example, the law of many States required certain contracts to be in a writing 
signed by the parties in order to be enforceable. Though the parties themselves might 
agree that certain communications constituted writings and certain acts constituted signa-
tures, there was no guarantee that any particular court might not disagree and proceed to 
apply its statute of frauds. Though some of the trading partner agreements used other 
tactics as well, such as agreements to waive the statute of frauds, those solutions did not 
provide the desired legal certainty. 
 35. ELECTRONIC COMMERCE GUIDE TO ENACTMENT, supra note 33, ¶ 140. On the limi-
tations inherent in interchange agreements generally, see BOSS & RITTER, supra note 28, 
at 8–9, 20–26; Boss, supra note 28, at 65–68. 
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require parties to opt in (for example, by incorporating the products’ 
terms into master agreements) are of limited utility. Soft law norms that 
operate independently of adoption by courts or legislatures have their 
limits. Thus, the challenge presented to UNCITRAL was to propose a 
legal structure for adoption by nations that would minimize the barriers 
to electronic commerce. Yet, having determined that the model trading 
partner agreements were of limited utility, the groundwork on which 
UNCITRAL proceeded to build its own legal structure was the body of 
norms that had begun to be articulated in the trading partner agreements 
themselves.36 
The challenge for UNCITRAL in articulating the legal norms for elec-
tronic commerce was fundamentally different than what it had faced in 
other areas, such as sales (whether it be sales, carriage of goods, securi-
ties, or secured transactions). In many of these other areas, norms had 
already developed on a national basis. Thus, in some areas of interna-
tional commercial rule-making development, the question was one of 
harmonization: how to take the laws of divergent nations (which in many 
cases had already developed their own norms and made them a part of 
their legal structures) and harmonize their provisions. In other areas, such 
as securities and secured transactions, there were some countries with 
very developed legal systems, and the question involved whether the le-
gal structures that had evolved in these countries could be or should be 
adapted for other legal cultures for use on an international basis. Elec-
tronic commerce was different. This was an area where there was no pos-
itive “hard” law in any country. Countries such as the United States, 
where electronic commerce was beginning to burgeon, were starting to 
acknowledge the need for legal norms, as the industry itself began to ask 
for a legal rubric to support its transactions; in other countries, wide-
spread use of electronic commerce was still in the future.37 At the time, it 
was noted that 
                                                                                                                       
 36. The foundation of UNCITRAL’s work in the body of business practices and 
norms that had begun to develop was fostered by the participation of the business com-
munity (along with the legal community) in UNCITRAL’s deliberations in the area of 
electronic commerce. See, e.g., ELECTRONIC COMMERCE GUIDE TO ENACTMENT, supra note 
33, ¶ 19. (“Chapter III of part one [of the Model Law] contains a set of rules of the kind 
that would typically be found in agreements between parties, e.g., interchange agree-
ments or ‘system rules.’”). 
 37. The concentration of electronic commerce use and revenues in those industria-
lized and developed countries with sophisticated technological infrastructures and its 
underutilization in developing countries is one aspect of what has been referred to as the 
great “digital divide.” UNCTAD has documented the existence of this divide. See U.N. 
Conference on Trade & Dev. [UNCTAD], Secretariat, Electronic Commerce and Infor-
mation and Communication Technologies for Development: Selected Issues, ¶¶ 5–8, U.N. 
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as of yet, none of the developing and developed countries, common law 
and civil law countries, and countries of different cultural and legal he-
ritages, have developed a comprehensive legal structure governing 
electronic commerce. Thus, the challenge is to take countries of diver-
gent economic capabilities, legal heritage, telecommunications infra-
structures, and needs, and bring them together to develop common ana-
lyses of, and approaches to, problems never encountered previously.38 
As a result, when UNCITRAL began work on a model law on elec-
tronic commerce, many countries took up parallel drafting efforts to deal 
with the same issues. The existence of parallel projects in the same field 
(relatively unhampered by prior hard law on point), the overlap between 
the personnel staffing the domestic lawmaking processes and those par-
ticipating in the international lawmaking setting, and the technological 
ability to instantaneously exchange information on new domestic and 
international developments created a law reform process that might best 
be described as “symbiotic,” with the domestic lawmaking projects and 
the international lawmaking projects influencing and being influenced by 
the other. The synergies between the domestic and international lawmak-
ing efforts created a process that worked to strengthen both.39 
As has been noted, the approach UNCITRAL initially took, once it had 
rejected the concept of a model interchange agreement, was to draft “le-
gal rules.” This original charge to the UNCITRAL Working Group, the 
preparation of legal rules, was a charge flexible enough to allow the 
Working Group to use whichever form was deemed appropriate: conven-
tion or treaty, or model law. Other techniques to promote harmonization 
of international trade law include model treaty provisions, uniform rules 
for parties to adopt, and legal guides. Indeed, up until its work was final-
ly completed, UNCITRAL was still contemplating whether it would pro-
duce a set of model rules, rather than a more coherent and principled text 
of a uniform law. Given the novelty of electronic commerce issues, the 
                                                                                                                       
Doc. TD/B/COM.3/62 (Oct. 7, 2003). UNCTAD has also developed an index for assess-
ing countries’ development in the field. See UNCTAD, The Digital Divide: ICT Diffusion 
Index 2005, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/ITE/IPC/2006/5 (2006). See also UNCTAD, Informa-
tion Economy Report 2007–2008: Science and Technology for Development: The New 
Paradigm of ICT, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/SDTE/ECB/2007/1, at 12 (2007) (prepared by 
the UNCTAD Secretariat) (characterizing the digital divide as still significant). Even 
developing countries, however, were involved in UNCITRAL’s efforts in the areas of 
electronic commerce, viewing the establishment of a supportive legal regime as one as-
pect of their creation of a hospitable environment for the growth of electronic commerce. 
 38. Amelia H. Boss, The Emerging Law of International Electronic Commerce, 6 
TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 293, 300–01 (1992). 
 39. See Boss, supra note 30, at 1958–63 (describing the symbiotic process at work in 
the evolution of standards for the attribution of electronic messages to purported senders). 
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differences that existed among the legal frameworks of the nation states, 
and the minimalist rules that it finally articulated, however, UNCITRAL 
ultimately did not venture to create a text that would bind the hands of 
the enacting State, choosing instead a “softer” approach, that of a model 
law: 
The Model Law is intended to provide essential procedures and prin-
ciples for facilitating the use of modern techniques for recording and 
communicating information in various types of circumstances. Howev-
er, it is a “framework” law that does not itself set forth all the rules and 
regulations that may be necessary to implement those techniques in an 
enacting State.40 
The key attribute of the model law approach, which supported 
UNCITRAL’s goal of providing merely a “framework law,” was the 
flexibility it gave countries in their implementation of its provisions. 
States considering the Model Law on Electronic Commerce (or “Model 
Law”) have the option of either enacting the Model Law as a single sta-
tute or incorporating the Model Law’s various provisions into specific 
parts of their domestic law.41 
The Model Law on Electronic Commerce was completed and adopted 
by the U.N. General Assembly in 1996, yet it began to influence the 
shaping of domestic electronic commerce laws even prior to its comple-
tion. This is not surprising, given that some domestic lawmaking efforts 
were proceeding on a parallel track at the same time, and as mentioned 
above, domestic and international efforts influenced each other. In the 
United States, drafting efforts to accommodate electronic contracting 
within the provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code were informed 
by the work on the Model Law, and these drafting efforts eventually con-
tributed to the formulation of the Uniform Electronic Transactions Act 
(“UETA”) in 1999.42 Similarly, work was being undertaken in Canada on 
                                                                                                                       
 40. ELECTRONIC COMMERCE GUIDE TO ENACTMENT, supra note 33, ¶ 13. 
 41. At one stage, the working group considered describing its product as model statu-
tory provisions rather than as a model law, noting that 
the text contained a variety of provisions relating to existing rules scattered 
throughout various parts of the national laws in an enacting State. It was thus a 
possibility that enacting States would not incorporate the text as a whole and 
that the provisions of such a “model law” might not appear together in any one 
particular place in the national law. 
Id. ¶ 142. 
 42. For a fuller description of the intricate relationship between domestic law devel-
opments in the United States and the Model Law on Electronic Commerce, see Boss, 
supra note 30. 
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a Uniform Electronic Commerce Act,43 but even before this act was 
passed, the provisions found their way into various aspects of Canadian 
law.44 Singapore was another early adopter of provisions somewhat in 
accord with the Model Law.45 
Though a soft law product, the success of the Model Law can be seen 
from its enactment by countries around the world, including the follow-
ing: developing countries (Vietnam) and developed countries; common 
law countries (Australia) and civil law countries (France); countries in 
North America (Canada), South America (Venezuela), Asia (Korea and 
China), the Middle East (Jordan), Europe, both West (the United King-
dom) and East (Slovenia), and Africa (South Africa).46 It has been used 
as the basis for domestic harmonization of e-commerce legislation in 
federal systems such as Canada47 and the United States,48 and as the basis 
for “hard law” harmonization projects by regional groups, such as the 
electronic commerce projects in the Southern African Development 
Community.49 
                                                                                                                       
 43. See John D. Gregory, The UETA and the UECA—Canadian Reflections, 37 
IDAHO L. REV. 441 (2001) (discussing the drafting of the Canadian Uniform Electronic 
Commerce Act). 
 44. Terms of the draft Model Law were used as the basis for regulations permitting 
electronic filing of speeding tickets issued in a photoradar system. See John D. Gregory, 
Electronic Documents in Ontario’s Photoradar System, 6 J. MOTOR VEHICLE L. 277, 281 
(1995). 
 45.  Electronic Transactions Act, No. 25, Cap. 88 (1998) (Sing.), available at 
http://statutes.agc.gov.sg/ (click “E” hyperlink; then follow “Electronic Transactions Act” 
hyperlink). 
 46. For a list of country enactments of the Model Law, see Appendix F: Domestic 
Enactments of the UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Commerce, in U.N. GUIDE TO 
ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS, supra note 18, at 493. See also UNCITRAL Texts and 
Status, http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts.html (last visited Apr. 5, 2009) 
(providing a list of UNCITRAL products and the countries that have adopted each prod-
uct). It should be noted that making any such list of enactments is difficult, since there is 
no requirement that countries report their use of the Model Law in designing and enacting 
domestic legislation. 
 47. The domestic enactment of the Model Law in Canada, the Uniform Electronic 
Commerce Act, was adopted by the Uniform Law Commission of Canada in 1999 and 
has since been implemented in every province but the Northwest Territories. See UNIF. 
LAW CONFERENCE OF CAN., STATUS OF UNIFORM ACTS RECOMMENDED BY THE COMMERCIAL 
LAW STRATEGY (2007), available at http://www.ulcc.ca/en/cls/CLS_Status_Acts_En.pdf. 
 48. The UETA has been enacted in forty-six U.S. states, the District of Columbia, and 
the U.S. Virgin Islands. See the Uniform Law Commissioners—A Few Facts About the 
Uniform Electronic Transactions Act, http://nccusl.org/Update/uniformact_factsheets/ 
uniformacts-fs-ueta.asp (last visited Apr. 5, 2009) (listing states adopting the UETA). 
 49. See South African Development Community, www.sadc.int (last visited Mar. 31, 
2009). See also Harmonization of E-Commerce Legal Framework for Southern Africa, 
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Why was the Model Law successful in bringing together countries “of 
divergent economic capabilities, legal heritage, [and] telecommunica-
tions infrastructures”?50 The success of the Model Law is due in large 
part to the fact that it was “a unique instrument in a legal landscape 
where there was no existing body of law, whether uniform international 
law or national law, which comprehensively addressed the issues raised 
by electronic commerce.”51 As such, the Model Law has been “an in-
strument of ‘preventive’ or ‘pre-emptive’ harmonization: it led the 
process of development of law by providing universally acceptable solu-
tions to the issues likely to arise, rather than being negotiated after prac-
tices and usage had already resulted in disparate laws and regulations.”52 
Of course, not all would agree that the Model Law on Electronic 
Commerce was successful. Professor Justin Hughes, for example, has 
argued that the convergence that emerged around the norms set forth in 
the Model Law “would have occurred at roughly the same pace with or 
without the UNCITRAL model.”53 It is true that the Model Law on Elec-
tronic Commerce was built on legal norms that were already developing, 
but Professor Hughes appears to completely discount the role that the 
Model Law had in legitimizing their development and contributing to 
their spread to countries, particularly developing countries, where there 
were no such norms. Indeed, the success of the Model Law should not be 
measured solely, or even primarily, by the number of countries that used 
the Model Law as the basis for their domestic enactments. It could be 
argued that the process itself had a greater impact than the product. Elec-
tronic commerce was so sufficiently new and unfamiliar to people that 
substantial time was spent in the negotiating sessions understanding the 
technologies and their use, as well as attempting to ascertain the manner 
in which existing law did or did not apply, or how it applied, to electron-
ic transactions. The sessions were not characterized by political posturing 
or attempts to persuade other delegations to adopt particular positions. 
Critically important were the exchange of ideas and the education that 
occurred about the challenges faced by electronic commerce. Countries 
                                                                                                                       
DOT-COMMENTS E-NEWSLETTER, Mar. 2007, at 19, available at http://www.dot-com-
alliance.org/newsletter/article.php?article_id=30. 
 50. Boss, supra note 38, at 300–01. 
 51. José Angelo Estrella Faria, Drafting and Negotiating History of the Electronic 
Communications Convention, in U.N. GUIDE TO ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS, supra 
note 18, at 17, 29. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Justin Hughes, Of World Music and Sovereign States, Professors and the Forma-
tion of Legal Norms, 35 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 155, 177 (2003). Professor Hughes calls the 
evolution of electronic commerce norms an “environment-based emergence of legal 
norms” or “invisible hand convergence.” Id. at 175. 
688 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 34:3 
could either be wary of these challenges and run from them, or embrace 
electronic technologies. The work of UNICTRAL encouraged them to do 
the latter by dispelling the fear of the unknown. The preparatory material 
along with the reports from each of the sessions were for many delega-
tions a gold mine of information about business practices as well as legal 
issues. 
Of course, not all countries adopted the Model Law on Electronic 
Commerce in a uniform manner. To some degree, this lack of uniformity 
in the adoption process was inherent in the choice of a model law format 
for the treatment of electronic commerce and in the needs of countries to 
conform the Model Law to their domestic law. But some of the nonuni-
formity arose for reasons that were not anticipated. 
IV. ACT TWO: THE EVOLUTION OF DIGITAL SIGNATURE LEGISLATION 
Even before the Model Law on Electronic Commerce was completed, 
problems began to surface. While the approach of the Model Law and its 
related siblings was one of enabling and supporting rather than regulating 
and guiding the use of electronic commerce, the argument was heard in 
some quarters that “more” was needed—more guidance, more regulation, 
more focus. Compounding this was the drafting in some states in the 
United States of digital signature statutes, which sought to enshrine in 
their provisions the recognition of a specific implementation and use of 
electronic technologies—digital signatures—and to establish public key 
infrastructures to support their use. 
Digital signature legislation grew out of the pioneering work of a 
group within the American Bar Association that saw the benefits that 
could be achieved by adopting this type of technology.54 While it is 
beyond the scope of this Article to delve into the intricacies of digital 
signatures and public key infrastructures, the following summary may be 
helpful. “Digital signatures” are an advanced form of cryptography used 
to guarantee the authenticity and integrity of electronic documents. How-
ever, their use between parties who do not deal directly with each other 
depends upon the existence of an infrastructure that allows the parties to 
determine the authenticity of the digital signatures themselves. Building 
a public key infrastructure that provides this ability in turn requires regu-
                                                                                                                       
 54. This movement had its genesis in the United States in the work of the American 
Bar Associations’ Section on Science and Technology, which promulgated the Digital 
Signature Guidelines in 1996. These Guidelines set out policy issues that needed to be 
faced in order to implement a legal structure to support the use of digital signatures. AM. 
BAR ASS’N, DIGITAL SIGNATURE GUIDELINES: LEGAL INFRASTRUCTURE FOR 
CERTIFICATION AUTHORITIES AND SECURE ELECTRONIC COMMERCE (1996), available at 
http://www.abanet.org/scitech/ec/isc/dsgfree.html. 
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lating the rights and responsibilities of the parties involved in such an 
infrastructure.55 Digital signature legislation attempted to further the 
adoption of these technologies by providing a mechanism for building 
the needed public key infrastructures and establishing the rights and re-
sponsibilities of the parties in that system. An early adopter of this ap-
proach was the state of Utah.56 
Digital signature legislation in the United States, particularly the Utah 
statute, was not without its critics, who raised several major concerns. 
First, the critics were concerned that having legislation dictate the use of 
one technology to the exclusion of others would interfere with the ability 
of private parties to determine the type of technology suitable for their 
particular transactions. Indeed, government regulators would replace 
businesses in determining the level of security and the propriety of au-
thentication techniques that businesses should use. Second, there was the 
concern that the technology as it then existed did not in fact deliver the 
level of security that it purported to, and that with the passage of time 
what was once secure would cease to be.57 Third, there was the concern 
that having a scheme that enshrined one technology and its application in 
a statutory form would freeze the development of other technologies and 
other business practices.58 This third concern reflected the view that the 
technology might not be implemented in the way that the early digital 
signature legislation foresaw, and that the technology itself might devel-
op in ways that the statute did not anticipate.59 Last, the balance struck in 
this digital signature legislation, particularly the risk allocation between 
                                                                                                                       
 55. For an overview of this technology and its application, see WARWICK FORD & 
MICHAEL S. BAUM, SECURE ELECTRONIC COMMERCE (2d ed. 2000); ONLINE LAW: THE 
SPA’S LEGAL GUIDE TO DOING BUSINESS ON THE INTERNET chs. 3–4, 31 (Thomas J. Sme-
dinghoff ed., 1996); UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON ELECTRONIC SIGNATURES WITH GUIDE 
TO ENACTMENT 2001, supra note 15, at 20–31, ¶¶ 31–62. 
 56. See UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 46-3-101 to -104 (1996), repealed by 2006 Utah Laws, 
ch. 21, § 13. 
 57. See, e.g., Henry Gabriel, The Fear of the Unknown: The Need to Provide Special 
Procedural Protections in International Electronic Commerce, 50 LOY. L. REV. 307, 316 
(2004) (“[A]ttempts to develop rules on standards and procedures to be used as substi-
tutes for specific instances of ‘signatures’ have been unsuccessful as they have tied the 
legal frameworks to a given state of technical development.”). 
 58. Zhang Chu & Lingfei Lei, The Chinese Approach to Electronic Transactions 
Legislation, 9 COMP. L. REV. & TECH. J. 333, 343 (2005) (“[W]hat may be an adequate 
technical solution today may cease to be adequate with advances in information technol-
ogies tomorrow.”). 
 59. See Jane K. Winn, The Emperor’s New Clothes: The Shocking Truth about Digi-
tal Signatures and Internet Commerce, 37 IDAHO L. REV. 353, 377–79, 381–82 (2001) 
(presciently predicting possible uses for digital signature technology). 
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users of the technology in the event of fraud,60 was attacked as inappro-
priate.61 
In response to the criticism that the Utah statute dictated or enshrined 
one technology to the exclusion of others, Illinois adopted an approach62 
(referred to as a “hybrid” or two-tiered approach) that combined the mi-
nimalistic provisions that were essential to both the Model Law on Elec-
tronic Commerce and the UETA and provisions that would support the 
technological choices made by private parties with additional protections 
given to those who chose to use electronic signatures. The Illinois act 
thus tried to retrieve the flexibility of the Model Law on Electronic 
Commerce while at the same time giving some certainty to the use of 
particular types of electronic technologies. 
Both the Utah and Illinois legislation had an impact outside the United 
States. While some countries adopted legislation like that in Utah, which 
prescribed particular technology in the form of digital signatures (legisla-
tion known as digital signature legislation),63 other countries, following 
Illinois, adopted hybrid legislation, which combined the supportive and 
minimalist provisions of the Model Law on Electronic Commerce (and its 
sibling the UETA) with the more regulatory provisions of digital signature 
legislation.64 In the United States, Illinois stood alone among the states 
taking such a hybrid approach; others stuck with the familiar UETA. In-
                                                                                                                       
 60. See Jane K. Winn, The Hedgehog and the Fox: Distinguishing Public and Private 
Sector Approaches to Managing Risk for Internet Transactions, 51 ADMIN. L. REV. 955, 
962 n.18 (1999). 
 61. See Jane K. Winn & Song Yuping, Can China Promote Electronic Commerce 
Through Law Reform? Some Preliminary Case Study Evidence, 20 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 
415, 438 (2007) (“This problem was described in the U.S. in the 1990s as ‘Grandma 
picks a bad password and loses her house.’”). 
 62. Illinois Electronic Commerce Security Act, 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 175/99-1 to -101 
(West 2001). The Illinois Act was signed into law before the promulgation of the Uni-
form Electronic Transactions Act, but has provisions validating electronic records and 
signatures that are similar to some in the UETA. The Illinois Act aims to ensure the inte-
grity of electronic records and the authenticity of electronic signatures by providing spe-
cial evidentiary rules for proving the integrity of electronic records and the authenticity of 
electronic signatures if “secure” electronic records and “secure” electronic signatures are 
used. Id. 175/10-120. 
 63. Early examples included Germany and Malaysia. 
 64. This led to attempts to categorize national electronic commerce legislation into 
one of three categories: minimalist (based on the Model Law on Electronic Commerce); 
prescriptive or regulatory (directing use of digital signature technology in particular); and 
hybrid or two-tiered legislation. See MORRISON & FOERSTER LLP, & STEPTOE & JOHNSON 
LLP, AN ANALYSIS OF INTERNATIONAL ELECTRONIC AND DIGITAL SIGNATURE IMPLEMEN-
TATION INITIATIVES: A STUDY PREPARED FOR THE INTERNET LAW AND POLICY FORUM 
(2000), available at http://www.ilpf.org/groups/analysis_IEDSII.htm [hereinafter ILPF 
ANALYSIS OF ELECTRONIC SIGNATURE INITIATIVES]. 
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deed, within the United States, both the Utah and Illinois approaches 
were eschewed in the drafting of the federal Electronic Signatures in 
Global and National Commerce Act (“E-SIGN”),65 which was passed in 
2000. E-SIGN, like the UETA, was built on the principle of technology 
neutrality, and preempts any state statute setting forth alternative proce-
dures or technologies for the use or acceptance of electronic signatures to 
establish the legal effect, validity, or enforceability of contracts unless 
that legislation does not “require, or accord greater legal status or effect 
to, the implementation or application of a specific technology or technic-
al specification for performing the functions of creating, storing, generat-
ing, receiving, communicating, or authenticating electronic records or 
electronic signatures.”66 Digital signature legislation, which does accord 
greater legal status to digital signatures, appears to violate this principle 
and therefore to be preempted by E-SIGN. The Illinois approach is more 
problematic, for while it does not necessarily single out digital signatures 
for special treatment, it does establish a category of “qualified” signa-
tures that are given greater legal significance. To this day, the debate still 
continues as to whether the laws of states that went beyond the UETA 
(such as Illinois) are or are not preempted by E-SIGN.67 
Following the enactment of E-SIGN in the United States, the Illinois 
legislation and the Utah legislation, which began digital signature legisla-
tion, were unable to gain additional adherents within the United States. 
Indeed, Utah ultimately repealed its digital signature legislation.68 None-
theless, the approaches these two states advocated did gain international 
adherents. 
On the international level, Singapore became the first country to enact 
the Model Law on Electronic Commerce, passing its Electronic Transac-
tions Act on July 10, 1998.69 This is the “good news.” Though the Singa-
pore legislation purported to enact the Model Law, it borrowed liberally 
as well from U.S. precedent. Many of its provisions are drawn from the 
Illinois Electronic Commerce and Security Act and the Utah Digital Sig-
                                                                                                                       
 65. Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 7001–
21 (2000). 
 66. Id. § 7002(a)(2)(A)(ii). 
 67. The creation in the Illinois Act of different categories of electronic signatures and 
records has been argued to violate the principle of technology neutrality and thus to be 
preempted by E-SIGN. At this stage, however, the preemption issues remain unresolved. 
See generally Jamie A. Splinter, Does E-Sign Preempt the Illinois Electronic Commerce 
Security Act?, 27 S. ILL. U. L.J. 129 (2002). 
 68. See UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 46-3-101 to -104 (1996), repealed by 2006 Utah Laws, 
ch. 21, § 13. 
 69. Electronic Transactions Act, No. 25, Cap. 88 (1998) (Sing.). 
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nature Act.70 Singapore’s action was not an isolated incident; others, 
such as Germany71 and Malaysia,72 followed suit. The European Union, 
in an effort to avoid diverse and incompatible electronic commerce re-
gimes among its countries, adopted an electronic signature directive giv-
ing special weight and importance to digital signatures.73 
The emergence of these types of digital signature legislation created a 
demand within UNCITRAL from countries that wanted more specific 
and detailed rules such as those in the digital signature legislation. There 
was an attempt (by the United States) to push for a convention based on 
the Model Law on Electronic Commerce, but work nonetheless pro-
ceeded first on electronic signatures.74 The result was the Model Law on 
Electronic Signatures, completed by UNCITRAL in 2001 (or “Second 
Model Law”). 
As a key participant in its deliberations observed, “the negotiation of 
the [S]econd [M]odel [L]aw proved to be more difficult” than the negoti-
ation of the earlier Model Law on Electronic Commerce.75 The debates 
during the drafting of the Second Model Law reflected divergent views 
on whether countries should take a leading role in defining technologies 
to be used by private parties, the degree to which party autonomy was to 
be respected, whether the law should reflect or direct developments in 
electronic commerce, and the appropriate level of government regulation 
of security in private relationships.76 The United States, where digital 
signature legislation was born, in many respects disinherited its child, 
and worked within UNCITRAL to keep the legislation as nonregulatory 
and permissive as possible.77 Industry groups such as the Internet Policy 
                                                                                                                       
 70. Compare id., with Illinois Electronic Commerce and Security Act, 5 ILL COMP. 
STAT. 175 (1999), and Utah Digital Signature Act, UTAH CODE. ANN. §§ 46-3-101 to  
-504 (1999). 
 71. Gesetz zur Digitalen Signatur [Signaturgesetz] [SigG] [German Digital Signatures 
Act 1997], Jun. 13, 1997, BGBl. I at 1870, 1872 (F.R.G.), available at http://net-law.de/ 
gesetze/sigg.htm. 
 72.  Digital Signature Act (1997) (Malay.), available at http://www.parlimen.gov.my/ 
actindexbi/pdf/ACT-562.pdf. 
 73. A Community Framework for Electronic Signatures, Council Directive 1999/93, 
2000 O.J. (L 13), 12 [hereinafter Council Directive 1999/93]. 
 74. See UNCITRAL, Working Group on Elec. Commerce, Proposal by the United 
States, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.IV/WP.77 (May 25, 1998). 
 75. Faria, supra note 51, at 30. 
 76. For the “official” summary of some of those debates, see UNCITRAL MODEL 
LAW ON ELECTRONIC SIGNATURES WITH GUIDE TO ENACTMENT 2001, supra note 15, at 13, 
¶¶ 18–19. 
 77. For the views of one of the American participants in the process, see Do You 
Know Who You Are Doing Business with? Signatures in a Digital Age: Hearing Before 
the H. Comm. on Science Subcomm. on Tech. (Oct. 28, 1997) (testimony of Stewart A. 
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and Law Forum,78 joined by academics,79 were critical of this digital sig-
nature legislation. But the pressure to do something beyond the Model 
Law on Electronic Commerce to provide added “security,” combined 
with a fascination with the new technology and a desire to lead the way 
in the field, created momentum within UNCITRAL to move forward in 
the field.80 
The final product, the Model Law on Electronic Signatures, was de-
scribed in its accompanying Guide to Enactment as “[b]uilding on the 
fundamental principles underlying article 7 of the UNCITRAL Model 
Law on Electronic Commerce” with a “modest but significant addition” 
offering “practical standards against which the technical reliability of 
electronic signatures may be measured.”81 It purported to reflect the prin-
ciple of “technology neutrality” as well.82 The Guide to Enactment did 
recognize the argument that “some countries consider that the legal is-
sues related to the use of electronic signatures have already been solved 
by the UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Commerce and do not plan 
to adopt further rules on electronic signatures until market practices in 
that new area are better established,” but opined that those also adopting 
the Model Law on Electronic Signatures “may expect additional bene-
                                                                                                                       
Baker, Steptoe & Johnson LLP), available at http://wbenton.tripod.com/tech/digisig_ 
testimony.htm. 
 78. ILPF ANALYSIS OF ELECTRONIC SIGNATURE INITIATIVES, supra note 64. 
 79. See, e.g., C. Bradford Biddle, Legislating Market Winners: Digital Signature 
Laws and the Electronic Commerce Marketplace, 34 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1225, 1226–27 
(1997); Winn, supra note 59, at 357. 
 80. Contributing to the pressure was the fact that the European Union in 1999 
adopted a digital signature directive. Council Directive 1999/93, supra note 73, at 14. 
The goal of the directive was to harmonize the law among the Member States, which had 
taken divergent directions to electronic commerce: Germany and Italy were great suppor-
ters of digital signature legislation, while States such as the United Kingdom shared the 
skepticism of many about the viability of such legislation, preferring instead the more 
flexible and technology-neutral approach exemplified in the UNCITRAL Model Law on 
Electronic Commerce. The existence of the directive, however, was an extremely influen-
tial factor in the debates leading to the evolution of the UNCITRAL Model Law on Elec-
tronic Signatures, as it was effectively viewed as the “law” and the position of all the EU 
Member States. 
 81.  UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON ELECTRONIC SIGNATURES WITH GUIDE TO 
ENACTMENT 2001, supra note 15, at 8, ¶ 4. 
 82. Id. art. 3. See also id. at 9, ¶ 5; id. at 18, ¶ 27; id. at 21, ¶ 34; id. at 33, ¶ 67; id. at 
40, ¶ 88; id. at 48–49, ¶ 107. Nonetheless, the Guide to Enactment makes it clear that the 
purpose of the Model Law was to validate the use of one particular technology—digital 
signatures—and to provide a structure for its implementation. Id. at 18–19, ¶ 28 (“The 
Model Law thus provides common grounds for [public key infrastructure] systems rely-
ing on independent certification authorities and electronic signature systems where no 
such independent third party is involved in the electronic signature process.”). 
694 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 34:3 
fits” in providing guidance in the establishment of public key infrastruc-
tures (although it was not necessarily limited to such systems).83 
Despite this language about the relationship between the two model 
laws, the Model Law on Electronic Signatures represented an important 
departure in tone and direction from its older sibling. While the earlier 
Model Law merely provided that an electronic signature could satisfy the 
legal requirements of a signature if it was “as reliable as was appropri-
ate,” the Model Law on Electronic Signatures set out the circumstances 
under which an electronic signature was considered to be reliable.84 It 
also set out rules for assessing the conduct of the signatory,85 the relying 
party,86 and any certification service provider,87 as well as standards for 
determining the trustworthiness of systems, procedures, and human re-
sources.88 All of the detailed rules have one primary (or sole) application: 
the use of digital signatures in public key infrastructures.89 The Model 
Law on Electronic Signatures was thus more specific, with less flexible 
rules, and gave more power to governments to set the rules for determin-
ing the acceptability of electronic signatures. More significantly, while 
the Model Law on Electronic Commerce had been acceptable to a wide 
variety of nations, the Model Law on Electronic Signatures was more 
controversial. 
Once the Model Law on Electronic Signatures was completed (and 
even before then), it too began to have an impact. Or, in Professor Mac-
donald’s words, depending upon one’s view, the “virus” had begun to 
spread.90 The Model Law on Electronic Signatures, though it did not re-
ceive the same reception as the Model Law on Electronic Commerce, did 
gain a number of adherents.91 Just as the Model Law on Electronic 
                                                                                                                       
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. art. 6(3). 
 85. Id. art. 8. 
 86. Id. art. 11. 
 87. Id. art. 9. 
 88. Id. art. 10. 
 89. Indeed, a fair amount of the UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Signatures 
Guide to Enactment is devoted to explaining the operation of digital signatures and public 
key infrastructures. See id. at 20–31, ¶¶ 31–62. 
 90. See Macdonald, supra note 13, at 635–49 (discussing the viral propagation meta-
phor). 
 91. Though it is difficult to determine the extent to which the Model Law on Elec-
tronic Signatures has had favorable reception, as most of the digital signature legislation 
predates the Model Law on Electronic Signatures, the UNCITRAL website reports that 
legislation based on the UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Signatures has been 
adopted in China (2004), Mexico (2003), Thailand (2001), the United Arab Emirates 
(2006), and Viet Nam (2005), and that legislation influenced by the principles on which 
the Model Law is based has been enacted in Costa Rica (2005). UNICTRAL Model Law 
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Commerce has been used for regional harmonization projects, the Model 
Law on Electronic Signatures has been advanced as a template for re-
gional harmonization projects on cyberlaw.92 
Yet, in fashioning their own laws, some countries relied less on the 
Model Law on Electronic Signatures than on other digital signature legis-
lation. An example is China, with its enactment of the Electronic Signa-
tures Law and the Administrative Measure on Electronic Certification 
Service.93 Other countries that jumped on the digital signature bandwa-
gon include Dubai and Nepal.94 One commentator has noted that cross-
border recognition of signatures and their supporting devices, one of the 
primary goals of the Model Law on Electronic Signatures, “remains a 
largely unsettled issue,”95 mainly because of the lack of worldwide im-
plementation of common standards. 
It should be noted, however, that most if not all of the countries that 
have recently adopted digital signature legislation have been developing 
                                                                                                                       
on Electronic Signatures—Status, http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/elec 
tronic_commerce/2001Model_status.html (last visited Apr. 5, 2009). 
  However, as noted, other countries, such as Germany, have independently 
adopted legislation more akin to the UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Signatures. 
See Minyan Wang, A Review of Electronic Signatures Regulations: Do They Facilitate or 
Impede International Electronic Commerce?, 156 ACM INT. CONF. PROC. SERIES 548 
(2006), abstract available at http://portal.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=1151454.1151458#. 
Other countries have adopted legislation dealing specifically with and giving special 
treatment to digital signatures and their use in electronic commerce. See Jeff Hynick, 
May I Borrow Your Mouse? A Note On Electronic Signatures in The United States, Ar-
gentina and Brazil, 12 SW. J. L. & TRADE AM. 159, 174–75 (2005) (noting the lack of 
technology neutrality in the digital signature statutes in Argentina and Brazil, and their 
lack of flexibility to accommodate advances in technology). 
 92. See, e.g., UNCTAD, E. Af. Cmty. Secretariat, Report of the 2d Regional Task-
force Meeting on Cyber Laws, U.N. Doc. EAC/TF/2/2008 (Jun. 23–25, 2008). 
 93. See generally Gao Fuping, Implementation of the Electronic Communications 
Convention: A Chinese Perspective, in U.N. GUIDE TO ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS, 
supra note 18, at 385. See also Chu & Lei, supra note 58, at 342; Aashish Srivastava, No 
Rice, No Wife to Cook: An Analysis of the Electronic Signatures Law of China, 13 INT’L 
J.L. & INFO. TECH. 437, 438 (2005). 
 94. Other examples of countries with a required digital signature regime such as Chi-
na’s include Nepal and Dubai. Stephen E. Blythe, On Top of the World and Wired: A 
Critique of Nepal’s E-Commerce Law, 8 J. HIGH TECH. L. 1 (2008). See also Stephen E. 
Blythe, Azerbaijan’s E-Commerce Statutes: Contributing to Economic Growth and Glo-
balization in the Caucasus Region, 1 COLUM. J. E. EUR. L. 44 (2007) (noting that Azer-
baijan has a permissive digital signature regime); Stephen E. Blythe, The Dubai Electronic 
Transactions Statute: A Prototype for E-Commerce Law in the United Arab Emirates and 
the G.C.C. Countries, 23 J. ECON. & ADMIN. SCI. 103, 111, 114 (2007), available at 
http://jeas.cbe.uaeu.ac.ae/jeas2007_Jun/04_Stephen.pdf (explaining and analyzing Du-
bai’s Electronic Transactions Law). 
 95. Faria, supra note 51, at 30. 
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countries. Moreover, most of the countries that have adopted digital sig-
nature legislation or even the hybrid version exemplified by the Euro-
pean Union have found that it has failed to promote the use of digital 
signature technology in electronic commerce. While the use of digital 
signatures has increased, it has not been in the business context that the 
digital signature legislation contemplated. Several studies in the Euro-
pean Union from 2002 to 2006 illustrate this point. The first, undertaken 
on behalf of the European Commission in 2002, found that there was “no 
natural market demand” for qualified certificates and related services,96 
and “low market uptake” of public key infrastructure technologies.97 The 
report observed that the directive “focuses strongly on one business 
model which took center stage from 1998 to 2000, but which has since 
been replaced by a more heterogeneous and complex market.”98 A 
second study in the United Kingdom revealed similar results about the 
marketplace.99 A final report issued by the Commission in 2006 on its 
electronic signatures directive found that private parties had not been 
using digital signatures in their private transactions with commercial par-
ties,100 and that there has been a “very slow take up” on the use of ad-
vanced or qualified electronic signatures, yet it also found that many oth-
er simpler electronic signature applications had become available.101 The 
report advanced a number of theories for these findings: technical prob-
                                                                                                                       
 96. Interdisciplinary Ctr. for Law & Info. Tech., The Legal and Market Aspects of 
Electronic Signatures: Legal and Market Aspects of the Application of Directive 
1999/93/EC and Practical Applications of Electronic Signatures in the Member States, 
the EEA, the Candidate and the Accession Countries (2003) (prepared by Jos Dumortier 
et al.), available at http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/eeurope/2005/all_about/ 
security/electronic_sig_report.pdf. 
 97. Id. ¶ 5.1. 
 98. Id. ¶ 5.5.3. 
 99. RICHARD WILSHER & JANE HILL, DEP’T OF TRADE & INDUS., REPORT ON THE 
IMPACT IN THE UNITED KINGDOM OF THE EC ELECTRONIC SIGNATURES FRAMEWORK 
DIRECTIVE, 2003, Doc. DTI TFBJ/C/003/006 IX, 2003, at 7, quoted in Winn & Yuping, 
supra note 61, at 441 n.85 (“[T]he study uncovered a far greater degree of indifference, 
cynicism and lack of faith in private sector use of electronic signatures than it did enthu-
siasm and belief in a burgeoning market.”). 
 100. See Report on the Operation of Directive 1999/93/EC on a Community Frame-
work for Electronic Signatures, ¶ 5.2, COM (2006) 120 final (Mar. 15, 2006) [hereinafter 
Report on the Operation of Council Directive 1999/93]. See also Jane K. Winn & Brian 
H. Bix, Diverging Perspectives on Electronic Contracting in the U.S. and EU, 54 CLEV. 
ST. L. REV. 175, 180 (2006) (discussing substantive and procedural fairness in electronic 
contracting between individuals and commercial parties). 
 101. Report on the Operation of Council Directive 1999/93, supra note 100, ¶ 3.1. The 
use of digital signatures was found to be limited to the e-banking and e-government are-
nas. Id. ¶ 3.2. 
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lems in the market place, a lack of criteria for certification and mutual 
recognition, a lack of interoperability at national and cross-border levels, 
and the existence of isolated areas where certificates were used for a sin-
gle purpose.102 The Commission report noted that 
[t]he main reason for the slow take-off of the market is economic: ser-
vice providers have little incentive to develop multi-application elec-
tronic signature[s] and prefer to offer solutions for their own services, 
for instance, solutions developed by the banking sector. This slows 
down the process of developing interoperable solutions. The lack of 
applications . . . might also prevent the development of a multi-purpose 
e-signature, which requires reaching a critical mass of users and 
usage.103 
Some developing countries had adopted electronic commerce legisla-
tion with a hope that by eliminating the barriers to electronic trade they 
might promote greater electronic commerce by their businesses. What 
these studies were beginning to demonstrate is that hopes of building 
strong digital signature infrastructures were not even being realized in 
developed countries through digital signature legislation.104 
Professor Jane Winn, a noted scholar in the field, predicted this result 
shortly after the Model Law on Electronic Signatures was completed: 
Some . . . believed that the E-Signatures Model Law was based on an 
outmoded idea of how digital signatures are likely to be used in Internet 
commerce and thought that the Model Law compounded this shortcom-
ing by mandating risk allocation rules that are counter-intuitive and un-
productive. In addition, the E-Signatures Model Law was promulgated 
by UNCITRAL after developed countries had already passed laws deal-
ing with the same subject matter in quite different ways than the Model 
Law. Because it is unlikely any developed countries are going to repeal 
their current laws in order to enact legislation based on the Model Law, 
the Model Law is unlikely to achieve its objective of harmonizing law 
in this area. What it is likely to do, however, is encourage developing 
countries to pass laws that are out of step with actual commercial prac-
tice in Internet commerce, further disadvantaging their local businesses 
that try to compete in the global information economy.105 
                                                                                                                       
 102. Id. ¶ 3.3.2. 
 103. Id. ¶ 5.2. 
 104. See, e.g., Winn & Yuping, supra note 61, at 417 (suggesting that “government 
efforts to promote the use of electronic commerce among local businesses will require 
much more than transferring legislative models created for developed market economies 
to transition economies such as China’s if they are to succeed”). 
 105. Jane Winn, Electronic Commerce Law: 2001 Developments, 57 BUS. LAW. 541, 
550 (2001). Others knowledgeable in the field have agreed. See John D. Gregory, Cana-
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Professor Winn’s views, though they may be shared by many people in 
many countries, have not been universally adopted. The European Com-
mission was not deterred by the failure of the market to adopt digital sig-
natures; instead, it stated that it would continue to encourage the devel-
opment of e-signatures services and applications, with an emphasis on 
interoperability and cross-border use.106 So while the jurisdiction that 
pioneered it all, Utah, repealed its law, the first digital signature law, fif-
teen years after its passage,107 with the observation that the legislation 
had been unsuccessful in encouraging the establishment of digital signa-
ture systems,108 digital signature and electronic signature legislation con-
tinues to find fertile ground for propagation in other countries. 
V. LESSONS FROM THE TWO MODEL LAWS 
The two UNCITRAL Model Laws tell different stories. One, the Mod-
el Law on Electronic Commerce, though criticized for not doing enough, 
gained great acceptance throughout the world. The other, criticized for 
doing too much, has nonetheless also been utilized as a guide for coun-
tries wishing to adapt their laws for electronic commerce. Neither has 
been enacted uniformly, and variations exist in their implementation 
from country to country. Could it be said that one of the Model Laws is 
more successful than the other? 
Judging from the goals of the two laws, the Model Law on Electronic 
Commerce is arguably more successful. Its main goal was the removal of 
legal barriers to electronic commerce, a goal it has to some degree 
achieved. The goal of the Model Law on Electronic Signatures was lof-
                                                                                                                       
dian and American Legislation on Electronic Signatures with Reflections on the Euro-
pean Union Directive (2001), http://droit-internet-2001.univ-paris1.fr/pdf/ve/Gregory_J.pdf 
(“[E]-commerce is global in scope, and neither country wants to take a seriously different 
approach from its major partners.”). 
 106. Winn, supra note 105. 
 107. The bill repealing the Utah Digital Signature Act was signed into law in 2006. 
S.B. 20, 2006 Leg., Gen. Sess. (Utah 2006) (enacted). For the repeal of the Utah Digital 
Signature Statute Rules, see 22 UTAH BULL. 16 (Nov. 15, 2007). 
 108. See Wendy Leibowitz, Utah Will Repeal Its Digital Signature Law, Never Used, 
as Tech, National Law Diverged, 10 Electronic Com. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 48 (Dec. 21, 
2005), available at http://ipcenter.bna.com/pic2/ip.nsf/id/BNAP-6KCM2E?OpenDocument 
&PrintVersion=Yes (On March 10, 2006, Utah’s Governor signed S.B. 20, supra note 
107, repealing the Utah Digital Signature Act because no one was using digital signa-
tures.). Although electronic commerce has not gone heavily into digital signatures and 
public key infrastructures, a number of governments in Europe use it for communications 
with the government in areas such as tax filings and identity cards. See DESIGNING E-
GOVERNMENT: ON THE CROSSROADS OF TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION AND INSTITUTIONAL 
CHANGE (J.E.J. Prins ed., 2001). 
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tier: to set common standards for the recognition of electronic signatures 
in a way that allowed for cross-border recognition. As noted, that has not 
occurred. The differences, however, are greater. The Model Law on 
Electronic Commerce was built on prior business practices that had 
evolved internationally, and found much inspiration in the trading partner 
agreements that had been drafted over the years for use by commercial 
parties. The Model Law on Electronic Signatures was built on a technol-
ogy that had not yet received widespread use, and was an attempt to 
guide the development of business practices and norms. And while the 
Model Law on Electronic Commerce gave great leeway to parties to de-
termine their own levels of security in their business dealings, the Model 
Law on Electronic Signatures gave a greater role to governmental entities 
to determine the trustworthiness of signature technologies. 
Arguably, while the Model Law on Electronic Commerce emphasized 
the common goal of many countries to accommodate electronic com-
merce to paper-based rules by establishing an equivalence between the 
two, the Model Law on Electronic Signatures emphasized the distinc-
tions among countries based to a large extent on cultural predispositions. 
The first Model Law on Electronic Commerce resonated with societies 
where there was emphasis on a free marketplace with the maximum 
amount of party autonomy, where the thought was that practice should 
lead and the law should follow. The Model Law on Electronic Signa-
tures, however, represented a different philosophy: that the law should 
lead and tell private commercial parties the manner in which they should 
do business. Although the Model Law on Electronic Signatures carefully 
tried to continue the emphasis on technology neutrality and party auton-
omy, it was readily adaptable (and has been adapted) in ways that under-
cut these basic notions. 
The comparison of the Model Law on Electronic Commerce and the 
Model Law on Electronic Signatures vividly illustrates the point that not 
all “soft laws,” though drafted by the same body on roughly the same 
subject matter, are equal. Though both Model Laws professed to be flex-
ible in their implementation, the Model Law on Electronic Commerce 
may be characterized as setting forth general principles (e.g., an electron-
ic signature may satisfy signature requirements if it is reliable), whereas 
the Model Law on Electronic Signatures attempted to lay out the stan-
dards by which the general principle was to be applied.109 The Model 
                                                                                                                       
 109. There is another example in electronic commerce demonstrating that attempts to 
develop rigid detailed rules for electronic commerce may be doomed, compared to at-
tempts to develop more general principles that can be adapted to changes in technology 
and the evolution of practices. The UETA (adopted in 1999), consisting of only twenty-
one provisions, has been adopted in forty-eight states and jurisdictions and become the 
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Law on Electronic Commerce is an example of principles-based harmo-
nization, as opposed to rules-based harmonization exemplified by the 
Model Law on Electronic Signatures. 
Of course, the success of the Model Laws should not be measured 
solely on the basis of the number of enactments; as noted above, enact-
ments may or may not result in harmonization. Moreover, harmonization 
may not be the only criteria by which to measure success. Articulation of 
the legal issues by a body of the stature of UNCITRAL performs the im-
portant function of educating people about some of the legal ramifica-
tions of using electronic technologies: “[t]he Commission noted with 
satisfaction that the Working Group had become generally recognized as 
a particularly important international forum for the exchange of views 
regarding the legal issues of electronic commerce and for the preparation 
of solutions to those issues.”110 
Second, apart from its pure educational value, the Model Law serves as 
a framework for countries that wish to draft their own law on electronic 
commerce, rather than adopt in full the work of the United Nations. In 
some countries, such as Sweden, the Model Law may be used as a guide 
for reviewing existing legislation to determine whether it satisfies the 
principles laid out in the Model Law. It is noteworthy that the provisions 
of the Model Law on Electronic Commerce are even being used by 
UNCITRAL, which includes them in its other products in an attempt to 
                                                                                                                       
foundation of federal legislation. Uniform Law Commissioners: The National Conference 
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, A Few Facts About the Uniform Electronic 
Transactions Act, http://nccusl.org/Update/uniformact_factsheets/uniformacts-fs-ueta.asp 
(last visited Apr. 3, 2009). The Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act 
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in only two states. Uniform Law Commissioners: The National Conference of Commis-
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 110. ELECTRONIC COMMERCE GUIDE TO ENACTMENT, supra note 33, ¶ 16. 
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accommodate electronic commerce.111 Third, even in the absence of 
positive domestic law adopting the provisions of the Model Law, it is 
possible that when disputes arise in the international context, the Model 
Law may be used as an authoritative source of norms (even if not bind-
ing) in the application of relevant domestic legal principles. 
In this respect, it is the process that is important: Who are the partici-
pants? What is the nature of the discussions? How are the debates 
framed? From the perspective of at least one participant in the process, 
there was a substantial difference between the negotiations on the Model 
Law on Electronic Commerce and the Model Law on Electronic Signa-
tures. The former negotiations were populated by those who, struggling 
to understand the nature of electronic commerce, were open-minded as to 
possible solutions and were not advocates of a particular technology or 
position. As a result, there was substantial give and take among the par-
ticipants and more learning resulted. By the time of the negotiations on 
the Model Law on Electronic Signatures, countries’ views had solidified 
more around preferred approaches and desirable technologies; the partic-
ipants were more often instructed by their governments on what positions 
to take, and there was more jockeying in trying to achieve ultimate goals. 
Academics and businesspeople were more common in the first set of ne-
gotiations, government functionaries and diplomats in the second. And, 
as has been observed, it is more difficult to produce detailed and precise 
rules (as the Model Law on Electronic Signatures attempted to do) than 
flexible, open-ended provisions that can accommodate diversity.112 
VI. ACT THREE: THE UNCITRAL CONVENTION ON THE USE OF 
ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL CONTRACTS 
The Model Law on Electronic Commerce was completed in 1996, and 
the Model Law on Electronic Signatures was completed in 2001. As 
UNCITRAL began to consider what other work, if any, to undertake in 
the area of electronic commerce, the concept that had surfaced earlier, 
preparing a convention as opposed to a model law, was resurrected. Al-
though there were cogent arguments that the two model laws were suffi-
cient to provide countries with a structure for electronic commerce, it 
was argued that a convention “could contribute to the legislative arsenal 
of means of increasing legal certainty or commercial predictability in 
electronic business transactions—alongside [the Model Law on Electron-
                                                                                                                       
 111. See Block-Lieb & Halliday, supra note 16, at 864. 
 112. Harry C. Sigman, Comments at the Dennis J. Block Center for the Study of Inter-
national Business Law and the Brooklyn Journal of International Law Symposium: Rul-
ing the World: Generating International Legal Norms (Oct. 24, 2008). 
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ic Commerce].”113 Such a convention would apply to transactions under 
international conventions like the Convention on the International Sale of 
Goods, where the application of countries’ domestic electronic com-
merce laws might be problematic, and since a convention was arguably 
easier for some countries to adopt than a model law, this type of conven-
tion would encourage wider adoption of electronic commerce rules.114 
But for some, the strongest argument was that the “hard law” of a con-
vention would visibly demonstrate that the principles on which it is 
based are no longer tentative, but are viable, workable solutions that “de-
serve more legal force behind them.”115 An unarticulated hope for some 
participants was that a convention would encourage countries to abandon 
alternative approaches based on specific technology and represent a re-
turn to the technology-neutral, media-neutral principles on which the 
original Model Law on Electronic Commerce was based.116 
The United Nations Convention on the Use of Electronic Communica-
tions in International Contracts (“Convention”) has been described as 
building on the Model Law on Electronic Commerce.117 The terminology 
used in the Convention is drawn from the Model Law on Electronic 
Commerce.118 More importantly, many of the Convention’s key provi-
                                                                                                                       
 113. John D. Gregory, The Proposed UNCITRAL Convention On Electronic Contracts, 
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 115. Id. 
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 118. More specifically, it adopts the vernacular of the UNCITRAL Model Law on 
Electronic Commerce of referring to “data messages.” Compare 2005 UNITED NATIONS 
CONVENTION ON THE USE OF ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL 
CONTRACTS, supra note 15, art. 4(c), with UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON ELECTRONIC 
COMMERCE, supra note 15, art. 2(a). Compare also 2005 UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION 
ON THE USE OF ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL CONTRACTS, supra note 
15, art. 4(d), with UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON ELECTRONIC COMMERCE, supra note 15, 
art. 2(c) (originator); 2005 UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE USE OF ELECTRONIC 
COMMUNICATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL CONTRACTS, supra note 15, art. 4(e), with 
UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON ELECTRONIC COMMERCE, supra note 15, art. 2(d) (addres-
see); 2005 UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE USE OF ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS 
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sions have their roots in the Model Law: the basic concept that commu-
nications or contracts shall not be denied validity or enforceability solely 
because of their electronic form;119 the treatment of form requirements 
such as writing requirements,120 signature requirements,121 and require-
ments for an original; and the basic rules on time and place of dispatch 
and receipt of electronic communications.122 Not all of the substantive 
provisions of the Model Law on Electronic Commerce were carried over 
into the Convention; dropped were those provisions that had been omit-
ted from many domestic implementations of the Model Law.123 Lastly, 
there were articles added to the Convention that were absent in the Mod-
el Law.124 Significantly, several of the newer additions had originally 
appeared in domestic legislation that was based on the Model Law on 
Electronic Commerce, continuing the symbiotic process between interna-
                                                                                                                       
IN INTERNATIONAL CONTRACTS, supra note 15, art. 4(f), with UNCITRAL MODEL LAW 
ON ELECTRONIC COMMERCE, supra note 15, art. 2(f) (information system). 
 119. Compare 2005 UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE USE OF ELECTRONIC 
COMMUNICATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL CONTRACTS, supra note 15, art. 8, with 
UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON ELECTRONIC COMMERCE, supra note 15, art. 5 (information 
shall not be denied legal effect, validity, or enforceability) and id. art. 11 (contract shall 
not be denied legal effect). 
 120. Compare 2005 UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE USE OF ELECTRONIC 
COMMUNICATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL CONTRACTS, supra note 15, art. 9(2), with 
UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON ELECTRONIC COMMERCE, supra note 15, art. 6. 
 121. Compare 2005 UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE USE OF ELECTRONIC 
COMMUNICATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL CONTRACTS, supra note 15, art. 9(3), with 
UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON ELECTRONIC COMMERCE, supra note 15, art. 7. 
 122. Compare 2005 UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE USE OF ELECTRONIC 
COMMUNICATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL CONTRACTS, supra note 15, art. 10, with 
UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON ELECTRONIC COMMERCE, supra note 15, art. 15. 
 123. Notable absences are the following provisions of the UNCITRAL Model Law on 
Electronic Commerce: Article 9 on the admissibility and evidentiary weight of data mes-
sages; Article 13 on the attribution of data messages (a concept that was not always car-
ried over into domestic laws; Article 14 regarding acknowledgement of receipt (which 
only applies if the parties themselves require such an acknowledgement); and the special 
rules in part two of the Model Law on the carriage of goods. The omission of the rules in 
part two bears emphasis: those rules were attempts to apply the general principles of the 
Model Law to the specific area of the carriage of goods, and were the most detailed and 
specific of the Model Law’s rules. 
 124. The three key new sections are Article 11 (invitations to make offers); Article 12 
(use of automated message systems for contract formation), and Article 14 (error in elec-
tronic communication). UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON ELECTRONIC COMMERCE, supra note 
15. The latter two sections were based on domestic legislation that had been enacted (e.g., 
the UETA in the United States), while the first responded to concerns about the legal 
status of offerings on websites and in other electronic communications. 
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tional and domestic efforts.125 Throughout the Secretariat’s Explanatory 
Note that accompanies the printed version of the Convention, there is 
repeated discussion of the Convention’s roots in the Model Law on Elec-
tronic Commerce and comparison of the Model Law’s provisions of that 
Model Law to those in the Convention. Thus, there appears to be a 
process of restatement (of those provisions that have worked),126 refine-
ment (of those provisions that need adjustment), rejection (of provisions 
deemed unneeded or ultimately unworkable), and reinforcement (through 
the addition of other related provisions). Notably absent in the Secreta-
riat’s Explanatory Note accompanying the Convention is any discussion 
of the other Model Law; in fact, there are only three passing references to 
the Model Law on Electronic Signatures.127 
As of the date of this Article, almost four years after the final adoption 
of the Convention on the Use of Electronic Communications in Interna-
tional Contracts in 2005, it has been signed by eighteen countries (not 
including the United States)128 but has received no ratifications. The rea-
                                                                                                                       
 125. Article 14 on errors in electronic communications is one such provision. See 
SECRETARIAT’S EXPLANATORY NOTE, supra note 15, ¶ 225 (“Recent legislation on elec-
tronic commerce, including some domestic enactments of the UNCITRAL Model Law, 
contain[s] provisions dealing with error . . . .”). Article 14 was “inspired by two statutes 
that aimed to implement the [U.N.] Model Law on Electronic Commerce, namely the 
Uniform Electronic Transactions Act . . . of the United States and the Uniform Electronic 
Commerce Act . . . of Canada.” John D. Gregory & Joan Remsu, Article 14: Error in 
Electronic Communications, in U.N. GUIDE TO ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS, supra 
note 18, at 198, 200. These pieces of domestic legislation were in turn based on trading 
partner or interchange agreements that frequently set forth error detection procedures and 
rules for assigning risk of error. 
  Article 12 on automated message systems also had its roots in domestic legisla-
tion. UNCITRAL, Working Group on Elec. Commerce, Report of the Working Group on 
Electronic Commerce on the Work of Its Forty-Second Session, ¶ 124, U.N. Doc. 
A/CN.9/546 (Dec. 8, 2003) (“A number of jurisdictions have found it necessary or at 
least useful to enact similar provisions in domestic legislation on electronic commerce.”). 
This domestic legislation included acts in the United States, UNIF. ELEC. TRANS. ACT § 
14(1) (2000); Canada, UNIF. ELEC. COM. ACT § 20 [ECA]; and the European Union, 
Council Directive 95/46, art. 15, ¶ 1, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31. 
 126. The Convention could be viewed as a statement that the principles set forth in the 
Model Law had obtained sufficient consensus and support so that hard law treatment in a 
convention was possible and desirable. 
 127. See SECRETARIAT’S EXPLANATORY NOTE, supra note 15, ¶¶ 22, 287 (Convention 
taken up after UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Signatures); id. ¶ 150 (referring to 
the UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Signatures Guide to Enactment for a descrip-
tion of digital signatures). 
 128. The following countries are signatories to the Convention: Central African Re-
public, China, Colombia, Honduras, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Lebanon, Madagascar, 
Montenegro, Panama, Paraguay, the Philippines, the Republic of Korea, the Russian Fed-
eration, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, and Sri Lanka. Status—United 
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son for the lack of action is unclear: do countries believe that there is no 
need for the Convention in light of the wide adoption of electronic com-
merce legislation? Or are countries waiting to see if the major proponent 
of the Convention, the United States, will enact it? 
Efforts are underway in the United States to achieve ratification, but 
the internal problems involved in ratification as the result of our federal-
ist system are significant.129 There is a drafting committee within the 
Uniform Law Conference in the United States exploring possible me-
chanisms for implementing the Convention should it be ratified.130 There 
are many reasons for the United States to implement the Convention. In 
its E-SIGN legislation, the United States adopted the principles of the 
Model Law on Electronic Commerce as part of its foreign policy. Part 
three of E-SIGN, which is directed to international developments, pro-
vides that the “Secretary of Commerce shall promote the acceptance and 
use, on an international basis, of electronic signatures,”131 but more spe-
cifically, encourage governments to “[r]emove paper-based obstacles to 
electronic transactions by adopting relevant principles from the Model 
Law on Electronic Commerce adopted in 1996 by [UNCITRAL].”132 E-
SIGN, however, does not give the same approval to more specific legis-
lation directed towards particular technologies.133 Given the support of 
                                                                                                                       
Nations Convention on the Use of Electronic Communications in International Contracts, 
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/electronic_commerce/2005Conventio_status
.html (last visited Apr. 5, 2009). 
 129. See Amelia H. Boss, The Future of the Uniform Commercial Code in an Increa-
singly International World, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 349, 352–58 (2007). 
 130. The Committee to Implement the U.N. E-Commerce Convention is chaired by 
Professor Henry Deeb Gabriel, Jr.; the reporter is Professor D. Benjamin Beard. Uniform 
Law Commission—National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, 
http://www.nccusl.org/Update/DesktopDefault.aspx?tabindex=0&tabid=59 (last visited 
Apr. 3, 2009). 
 131. Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act, 15 U.S.C. § 
7031(a)(1) (2000). 
 132. Id. § 7031(a)(2)(A). Three years earlier, the Clinton administration had specifical-
ly endorsed the work of UNCITRAL in the area of electronic commerce, saying “[t]he 
United States Government supports the adoption of principles along these lines by all 
nations as a start to defining an international set of uniform commercial principles for 
electronic commerce.” William J. Clinton & Albert Gore, Jr., A Framework for Global 
Electronic Commerce, http://people.hofstra.edu/peter_j_spiro/cyberlaw/framework.htm 
(last visited Apr. 11, 2009). 
 133. Other principles are directly aimed at undermining digital signature-specific legis-
lation. For example, permitting parties to a transaction “to determine the appropriate au-
thentication technologies and implementation models for their transactions, with assur-
ance that those technologies and implementation models will be recognized and en-
forced.” 15 U.S.C. § 7031(a)(2)(B). Or, taking a “nondiscriminatory approach to electron-
ic signatures and authentication methods from other jurisdictions.” Id. § 7031(a)(2)(D). 
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the United States for the Model Law and its encouragement of the Con-
vention within UNCITRAL, as well as the support the Convention has 
received from the legal community,134 there is a possibility of its ratifica-
tion. Failure of the United States to ratify the Convention, however, may 
be a disincentive for other countries to do so, and would therefore allow 
the proliferation of different types of electronic commerce legislation to 
continue. 
If the Convention fails to achieve substantial (or any) ratifications, and 
fails to come into force, would this mean it was a failure? If one meas-
ures success solely in terms of numbers of ratifications, and if one be-
lieves that a convention can only be successful if it comes into force, the 
answer is yes. But if one considers not only the product, but the process 
as well, there may be another answer. The existence of the Convention 
has already provided the incentive to some countries to adopt its provi-
sions as a matter of domestic law,135 and one commentator has observed 
that the Convention “has become a useful legislative tool for many de-
veloping countries.”136 In addition, the Convention has been used as the 
template for regional electronic commerce harmonization projects.137 The 
Convention arguably serves another important educational point: it rein-
forces and ratifies the principles upon which the original Model Law on 
Electronic Commerce was built. Those countries that have enacted digi-
tal signature legislation may find it necessary to reevaluate that legisla-
tion in light of the Convention’s provisions.138 
                                                                                                                       
 134. The ABA House of Delegates at its 2006 Annual Meeting passed Resolution 303 
recommending that the United States sign the Convention. Am. Bar Ass’n Annual Meet-
ing, Resolution 303 (Aug. 6–7, 2006), available at www.abanet.org/leadership/2006/ 
annual/dailyjournal/threehundredthree.doc. Two years later, it passed a second resolution 
recommending ratification. Am. Bar Ass’n Annual Meeting, Resolution 100 (Aug. 11–
12, 2008), available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/ecom/2008aug11_ 
resolution.htm. Similarly, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State 
Laws has indicated its support for the Convention. 
 135. See Jayantha Fernando, A Developing Country Perspective: The Impact of Elec-
tronic Communications Convention on Legislation in the South Asian Region, in U.N. 
GUIDE TO ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS, supra note 18, at 353, 355–73 (describing Sri 
Lanka’s use of the Convention in its drafting of its own electronic commerce laws). 
 136. Id. at 355. 
 137. See Connolly, supra note 18, at 315 (describing the projects in Southeast Asia). 
 138. See Fernando, supra note 135 (comparing the degree to which the laws of Sri 
Lanka and India are in conformity with the Convention, and noting that while the Con-
vention was taken into account in the drafting of the Sri Lankan legislation, it was not 
considered in the drafting of either the Indian legislation or proposed amendments to that 
legislation). As Fernando concludes: “[t]his review establishes that it is easier for a coun-
try to implement the Convention if it has adopted the Model Law on Electronic Com-
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CONCLUSION 
The law of electronic commerce has evolved significantly over the past 
two decades. The evolution of electronic commerce norms during that 
period reinforces the lesson in other areas of commercial law: it is imper-
ative that any legal structure be built upon and reflect commercial prac-
tices in order for there to be an acceptable and viable system for trade. 
The Model Law on Electronic Commerce was successful for that reason; 
the Model Law on Electronic Signatures demonstrates the difficulties of 
attempting to encourage particular business implementation structures 
for the use of particular technologies where no prior foundation for them 
exists in commercial practice. Second, while commercial practices are 
developing or in flux, it is imperative that any legal norms be sufficiently 
minimal and flexible to accommodate growth and change. The inherent 
flexibility of the Model Law on Electronic Commerce may be objection-
able because it fails to give specific guidance on how parties should 
manage business affairs, but that flexibility is its strength, as it will ac-
commodate newer technologies and emerging uses. Thirteen years after 
its completion, it is now the basis for a new international convention. Yet 
the Model Law on Electronic Signatures, eight years after its completion, 
has not had the results its proponents sought and has failed to keep pace 
with changes in commercial practice that have occurred. Perhaps, begin-
ning with the Utah digital signature legislation, too high a premium was 
placed on quickly producing a statute that represented the “new” tech-
nological face of government. 
The products of the evolution of electronic commerce norms tell one 
story; the process by which they were developed tells another. The 
process was one of symbiosis: symbiosis between the domestic and the 
international development of norms; between and among the countries; 
and between the legal world and the business world. Throughout the 
process, huge advances were made in appreciation of the technologies 
themselves, their uses, and the legal framework surrounding them. The 
educational process, however, is not always straightforward: there will 
be false starts, missteps, mistakes. It is not always easy to know whether 
a given direction is the right one to take. The question is whether the 
symbiotic process, over time, results in the correction of these false 
starts, or whether these false starts result in fragmentation of approaches 
among the countries. The symbiotic process in the electronic commerce 
arena was successful in the beginning, when all the participants in the 
process had questions, but no one purported to have “the” answer. As 
                                                                                                                       
merce, but it is more difficult if it has adopted the Model Law on Electronic Signatures.” 
Id. at 383. 
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differing views emerged on the need for and role of standards in the area 
of electronic commerce, the symbiotic process began to slow down. But 
lawmaking is a constant process of action, reaction, and interaction. Let 
us hope that the lull in symbiosis is temporary, and that the synergies that 
contributed to the early developments in the field continue. 
 
